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IIntroduction.
In hie annual message to Congress of December 2, 1823,
James Monroe, President of the United States, first publicly and
officially proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, In so far as it
referred to, and defined this policy, the text of the message
reads as follows:
"At the proposal of the Russian imperial government,
made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full
power and instructions have been transmitted to the Minister of
the United States at St. Petersburgh, to arrange, by amicable
negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two
nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar
proposal has been made by hie Imperial Majesty to the government
of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to In the
discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the
arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been
judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights
and interests of the United States are involved, that the American
continents, by the free and independent condition which they have
assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as
subjects for future colonization by any European powers.
"It was stated at the commencement of the last session,
that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal, to

2improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that
it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It
need scarcely be remarked, that the result has been, so far, very
different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that
quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and
from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and
interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish
sentiments the most friendly, in favor of the liberty and
happiness of their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. In
the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves,
we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with ou%
policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or
sericusly menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparation
for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are,
of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which
must be obvious tc ill enlightened and impartial observers. The
political system of the allied powers is essentially different,
in this respect, from that of America. The difference proceeds
from that which exists in their respective governments. And to
the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of
so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of the most
enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled
felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore,
to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the
United States and the powers, to declare, that we should consider
any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion
of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety. With
the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we

have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the
governments who have declared their independence, and maintained
it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and
on juet principles, acknowledged, we could not view any inter-
position for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling, in
any ether manner, their destiny, by any European power, in any
other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition
towards the United States 1,1
This enunciation of principles by Monroe was called
forth by indications of danger from two sources. The first of
these hinted at in the message quoted above was a difficulty with
Russia over certain claims which that country put forward to
territory on the western coast of North America. In September,
1821 by imperial decree Russian sovereignty was proclaimed over
all the Pacific coast north of the parallel of fifty-one degrees.
Against this both Great Britain and the United States protested.
President Monroe in hie message intimated that the Russian claims
were an attempt at colonization in the New World. To prevent
all such attempts he stated his proposition, the first of the
three fundamental principles of the original Monroe Doctrin^-
namely, that: "the American continents . . . are henceforth not to
be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European
pcrrers!
1. n i~harrteon, J. D
.
, Messages and Papers of the Pres idents , vol^,

The second danger which Monroe was striving to avert
was the danger of the intervention of the Holy Alliance in the
affaire of Spanish-America for the purpose of restoring the
revolted southern countries to the Spanish crown. The Holy
Alliance, consisting at that time of the four absolutist powers
Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France - had already intervened in
the interests of legitimacy and absolutism in Peninsular Spain,
and it was rumcred that an attempt would soon be made to restore
the old order in the revolted dominions of the Spanish crown in
America. The answer of the government of the United States to
this danger was the second principle in the Monroe Doctrine,
-
namely, that any interference with the existing political status
in the New World would be a manifestation of unfriendliness
towards the United States,
Aside from these two principles, Monroe reiterated in
his message that doctrine that John Bassett Moore called the
mcst fundamental of all our policies,- that is, the doctrine of
M r.-interventicn in European affairs,* This was the theory of
Washington and Jefferson,
These principles, then constituted the original Monroe
Dootrina as pronounced by James Monroe. As such this policy was
1. Moore, J. E., Amer ican Diplomacy
, pp. 131, 132,
2. Ibid
. . p. 133. Mr. Moore quotes these words of Washington:
•The great rule of conduct for ue in regard to foreign nations
is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them
as lit*le political connection as possible." Likewise quoting
Jefferson: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all
nations, entangling alliances with none."

5not difficult to define. Now, however, a simple definition of
the Monroe Doctrine is by no means so easy. The term has been
used very loosely, and it has come to mean popularly a variety of
different things. As Professor Hart says, n . . . . nobody
nowadays knows just what is meant by the phrase 'Monroe Doctrine',
-
it is a changeable expression, used frequently to electrify
current opinions on the relations of the United States with
Latin America by dynamic statements made a century ago."^
There are some eminent writers on history and politics
who urge today that the Monroe Doctrine has remained substantially
where it was in 1833, that it has never developed and can never
develop beyond the simple literal meaning of the three principles
expressed in the message of December 2, 1823. Many writers of
this type insist that practically all the so-called applications
of the Monroe Policy since its original statement have been
misapplications. Anything, they contend, beyond the strict,
literal meaning of Monroe's words is not the Monroe Doctrine, but
2
the doctrine of somebody else". There were then a Polk Doctrine,
a Seward Doctrine, an Olney Doctrine, a Roosevelt Doctrine, all
of which may have resembled, but certainly were not, the Monroe
Doctrine. From this point of view, the Monroe Policy is, indeed,
obsolete; and has been so ever since the disappearance of the
Holy Alliance from world politics. If this be the Monroe Doctrine,
it is truly a great error persistently to flaunt it in the face
of the world.
1. Hart, A. B., The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation , p. 2.
2. Compare Wooleey, T. 8., America's Foreign Po licy,, p. 235.

With all due respect for the opinions of this group of
thinkers, however, it seems to the writer that there is another
and more reasonable way of regarding the Monroe Doctrine. It
seems to me that a more correct interpretation of the principles
of Monroe would be that which allows them a deeper significance
than their purely literal meaning. The message of Monroe put
into concrete terms an expression of our foreign policy on two
1
particular cases; since the President and his Secretary of State,
John Quincy Adams, could not possibly foresee the events of the
future, this expression in its attempts to state the principles
which, while applying to those two particular cases, would also
apply in the future, must necessarily be vague and general. But
because these statements of policy are vague and general would
seem to me to be precisely the one thing necessary to insure the
elasticity of the Doctrine. The intention of the Monroe Policy
was the protection of the free Americas, including the United
States, against the evils of foreign domination. That intention,
the heart of the Doctrine has lived, and must live, while the
United States endures as an independent nation. It is that spirit
that we have named - very inadequately, perhaps - the Monroe
Doctrine. The message of 1823 we may consider merely as its
first public announcement. Since then, while the specific cases
which provoked that first announcement have long since disappeared,
the spirit has lived on; and each time that this counntry has been
called upon to act in defense of itself or of the free Americas
1. ie.. , as a protest first to Russia and then to Spain and the
Holy Alliance.

against the direct or indirect aggression of any overseas power,
whether or not the Policy of Monroe has been expressly invoked
as the basis of our action, we have been influenced throughout
by the same general intention, the same spirit that animated
Monroe and Adams in 1823. It is, of course, capable of growth
and development; it is the living spirit of the Monroe Doctrine.
Such seems to the writer to be the true conception of the Monroe
Policy; upon the basis of this conception the following pages
were written.
1. See also Hart, A. B., The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation
passim
.

II
The Venefuelan Boundary Dispute of 1895.
With the intervention of the United States in 1895 in
the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, the
Monroe Doctrine assumed a clear and definite form before the eyes
of the world. On that occasion the government of this country
first officially notified Europe of the existence of the Monroe
Doctrine as a part of the foreign policy of the United States,*
Ever sinoe the message of 1823 the subject had been much spoken
and written about, but never before had the government of the
United States in a communication addressed to any foreign power
2
formally described the message of 1823 as the Monroe Doctrine.
During the French occupation of Mexico at the time of our Civil
War. Secretary Seward - though protesting vigorously to the
government of Napoleon III - never once mentioned in his protests
3
the Monroe Doctrine,' Certainly, however, the principles
embodied in that policy were the basis of our complaint to France.
It would seem clear, too, that never in our independent history
has there arisen a case more literally a violation of the Monroe
Doctrine than the French subjugation of Mexico and the institution
there of imperial government under a European prince. It remained,
however, for President Cleveland and Secretary Olney in the
1. Stephens, F. F., "The Monroe Doctrine", University of Missouri,
Bulletin. XVII, No. 5, p. 11.
2. Edgington, T. B., The Monroe Doctrine , p. 130; cf. Lord
Salisbury's view.
3. Ibid . , p. 131.

9Venezuelan boundary caae to proclaim formally to the world the
adherence of the United States to the principles embodied by
President Monroe in his historic message of December 2, 1823.
If the Monroe Doctrine became in 1895 a formally
recognized part of our foreign policy, it began also at that time
to assume a far greater importance in the eyes of American
statesmen. The United States had remained apart from the Old
World for eighty years and more; our contact with Europe and Asia
had been chiefly commercial and essentially non-political. The
United States was interested first and foremost in America;
toward the Eastern Hemisphere we were almost indifferent. We of
the Western World considered ourselves politically self-sufficient.
In 1895 this, our theory, was tested and we were found ready to
abide by it.
Within three years afterward, we were engaged in a war
with Spain, a war from which the United States emerged as a
colonial and a world power. After that conflict we could no
longer interest ourselves in America and America alone. We had
to accept the responsibilities of our new place among the great
powers of the earth. After the Spanish war, with the growth in
power and influence of the United States, the Monroe Doctrine
grew and expanded. The first step, however, in this growth and
expansion had already been taken,- in the intervention of the
United States in the boundary dispute between Breat Britain and
Veneeuela in the year 1895.
The origins of the Venezuelan boundary dispute reach
far back into history. They had their root in the indef initeness
of the boundary line separating the old colonial possessions of

the Dutch in "Guayana" and the Spaniards in the captaincy-
general of Venezuela. The region of Guayana, or Guiana, was
discovered by the Spaniards in the early years of the sixteenth
century. They gave it the name "El Dorado" or "the Golden".
They never secured so firm a foothold in this region, however, as
they had in Mexico or Peru.
For about a century what is now the territory of
British Guiana remained in the hands of Spain, During the latter
half of this period, however, her colonies in America were
exposed to attack from the sea by the hostile Dutch and English,
le have records of raids on the coast of Guiana, in many of which
the name of Sir Walter Raleigh is very prominent. 1 For some
years neither the 3ritish nor the Dutch were able to get a footing.
In 1624 the Dutch finally established themselves at the mouth of
the Ee3equiko river and built there a fort, which they called
Fort gyak-overal
.
1
Throughout the long period of the Thirty
Years War the United Provinces held this post, and by the treaty
of Munster with Spain in 1648 the Netherlands were confirmed in
their title to the district. By this treaty, therefore, Spain
agreed to the separation from the old viceroyalty of New Granada
(which embraced the modern Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador) of a
part of the captaincy-general of Venezuela. In this treaty no
distinct statement was made regarding the boundary between the
3
Dutch territory and that of the captaincy-general of Venezuela.
1. Peruses, W. L. , The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics ,
pp. 266-73.
2. Ibid .
, p. 272.
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Though neither the Dutch nor the Spaniards made permanent
settlement3 in the region between the Orinoco and the Essequilo
rivers, both made extensive claims on this territory. Spain
claimed all of this region. The Dutch, more modest, asserted
their right to a part of it. It is certain, however, that in
spite of their most advanced claim, the Dutoh never extended any
settlements beyond the Parana and the mouth of the Moroco rivers. 1
Thus was created the boundary dispute which reached such an acute
stage in the year 1895.
The indef initenesa of boundary continued throughout the
period of the control of Spain and Holland over the two adjacent
regions. In 1803, however, the English in their war with France
and her allies, seized the Dutch settlements of Demerara, Berbice,
and Essequibo in Guiana; in 1814 she was granted the whole region
by treaty. 2 In 1810 Venezuela began her struggle for independence
from Spain. Thus the original parties to the boundary dispute
came to be changed: to England fell the old rights and claims of
Holland; to Venezuela were bequeathed the rights and claims of
Spain.
In 1845 the independence of Venezuela was recognized by
Spain. At that time the mother country by treaty declared the
Essequibo river to be the eastern boundary of Venezuela; that
line had been fixed earlier in the Venezuelan constitution of
1 . Scruggs , W. L. , The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics , p. 273
.
2. Parliamentary Papers , 1896 , Vol. 97 (documents and correspond-
relating to the question of boundary between British Guiar-^
and Venezuela), p. 22.

September 22, 1830. That Great Britain did not bo recognize that
river as the boundary of Venezuela was evident almost at the outset
In 1836 the English tried to establish a light-house at the mouth
of the Orinoco at Punta Barinm. This was, of course, far west of
the most extreme of the former legitimate claims of Holland. In
1841 the English engineer, Sir Robert Schomburgk, surveyed the
boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. His boundary line
reached the Atlantic coast at Punta Barima and marked off by a ser-
ies of posts a goodly share of the territory that Venezuela
claimed, and included that land within the limits of British
Guiana. 2 Though the Schomburgk line was shortly afterwards
partially repudiated by the British government, in 1890 Lord
Salisbury again put forward that boundary as the extreme eastern
limit which he would concede Venezuela. 4
In 1841 the boundary dispute between Great Britain
and Venezuela formally began. After some interchange of notes,
Lord Aberdeen, the British minister of foreign affaire, offered
as a compromise boundary the line of the Morooo river. Venezuela
declined this, and for thirty years matters were left as they were,
In 1876 the Venezuelan government reopened negotiations
1. Edgington, T. B., The Monroe Doctrine , p. 128. See also
Rodriguez, J. I., American Constitutions ,!, p. 191.
2. Schomburgk, R. H. , Description of British Guiana , pp. 1,2. On
page 1 the author thus describes the boundaries of Guiana: "It
is bounded on the north by the Atlantic and the eastern course
of the river Or inoco , . . . on the west by the northern course of
the Orinoco, the natural canal of Cassiquiare, and the
southern course of the Rio Negro."
3. Cleveland, G. , Presidential Problems , pp. 178,9.
4. Edgington, T. B., The Monroe Doctrine, p. 129.
5. Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy , pp. 152,3.
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with Great Britain by offering to accept the boundary proposed by
Lord Aberdeen; but the British government made a counter-proposal
announcing their willingness to regard this line as a partial
boundary but demanding as the price of this, a large strip of
territory to the west on the Venezuelan coast. * The suggestion was
rejected by Venezuela,
Up to about 1880 the negotiations between London and
Caracas had had the appearance of a simple dispute over an
unsettled boundary. The question now, however, assumed a more
sinister aspect; and it began to appear that perhaps the issue was
not the mere settlement of the exact position of a boundary line,
but was rather a matter concerning the territorial integrity of a
sovereign American state. In fact, the British government began a
policy toward Venezuela which in some respects seemed to resemble
very suspiciously the European policy of "peaceful penetration,"
one of the stock methods adopted by the powers of the Old World
preliminary to the annexation or armed occupation of weaker
countries. In 1879 and 1880, for example, when Venezuela again
opened up negotiations for a settlement of the problem, Lord
Salisbury claimed for England a vast region beyond the farthest
extension of the original Schomburgk line. This claim, the British
minister asserted, was based upon "certain ancient treaties with
2the aboriginal tribes, and subsequent concessions from Holland."
The region thus summarily declared a part of the British Empire
1. Edgington, T. E., The Monro e Poetrlne, p. 129
2. Scruggs, W.L., The Colombian and Venezuelan Re publics , p. 289.
quoted from the Official" History of the" Boundary E ispute ,
pp. 33-38.
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embraced "all territory on the coast between the rivers Essequibo
and Orinoco; likewise all territory south of the Imataca range of
mountains, east and northeast of a line extending from Barinia
Point to the table lands of Santa Maria,- the line to extend from
the last named point to near the left margin of the Caroni river,
and so around by the crest of the Pacaraime-Roaima range of
mountains to the Essequibo. Later, Lord Salisbury proposed for
England that a treaty be signed with Venezuela containing an arbi-
tration clause, but this plan was defeated by a change in the
British ministry. In 1886 Lord Roseberry, the successor of
Salisbury, proposed a new boundary. This was not so far west as the
line described by the British government in 1876; but with this
boundary England demanded the free navigation of the Orinoco,
which was refused by the Venezuelan government. In 1887 the
Venezuelans severed diplomatic relations with England.
In December, 1889, the English seized the main mouth of
the Orinoco, and Barima was declared a British port. In the next
year Lord Salisbury went back to the old Schomburgk line of 1841
and declared that the British government would not arbitrate with
regard to any territory east of that boundary. He also laid claim
to some land beyond that. The contention of England rested in the
main upon the desire to gain from Venezuela recognition of
British right tc all that territory in the basin of the Essequibo
river and those regions drained by its tributaries which had been
1. Scruggs, W. L., The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics
,
quoted from the Official HistorVof*" the Boundar y Dispute ,
pp. 39-51.
2. Edgington, T. E., The Monroe Doctrine, p. 129.
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"effectively occupied" by British colonists. 1 In pursuance of this
policy of "effective occupation" England seized the rich Yuruari
territory far in the interior of Venezuela. To this region, says
Mr. Edgington, "she had no shadow of a claim;" 2 it had never been
oocupied by the Dutch. Regardless of the fact that this territory
was in dispute, England never took any decisive action to
discourage the " effective occupation" by her citizens of any part
of the doubtful region. It would seem to many, therefore, that the
claims of Great Britain, which at least had grown more and more
comprehensive - if no more definite,- were unjust.
To illustrate the growth of the British claim we need
only cite some statistics from the British Statesman's Year Book.
In 1885 this authority gave the area of British Guiana as 76,000
square miles. In 1887 the same authority stated the area of the
same dependency as 109,000 square miles. Evidently there had thus
occurred during the two years an increase in the area of British
Guiana of 33,000 square miles.*" As there had been no wrangling
over the eastern and southern boundaries, this increase in area
must have been at the expense of Venezuela.
The situation in the Venezuelan matter was, then,
substantially at a deadlock in 1895, when the government of the
United States began to take an intense interest in the dispute.
Venezuela had several times appealed to this country for assistance
in securing arbitration, and the United States had several times
1. Dalton, L. V., Vene zuela, p. 102.
2. Edgington, T. E. , The" yonroe Doc tr ine , p. 129.
3. Parl iamentary Pape rs , v. 977 p. 57"
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offered to aid in securing a settlement. 1 The offers of this coun-
try to mediate, however, like a similar suggestion from Spain and
like the letters advising arbitration sent to Great Britain from
ten Latin-American governments, met with a cold reception from
that power. 2 Finally in the year 1895 Venezuela appealed once
more to the United States. The occasion for this was the arrest by
Venezuelan officials of British subjects and the fear on the part
of the small republic that Great Britain would exact reparation for
this act. The men arrested were inspectors belonging to the British
Guiana Police; they were seized in January, 1895 by Venezuelan
authorities on the Cuyuni river. The Venezuelan government
released these men, but they feared that Great Britain would
demand an indemnity. It was for protection against such a demand
that the Venezuelan President Crespo appealed to the government at
Washington.
In answer to this request of the Venezuelan government,
the State Department of this country instructed Mr. Eayard, the
American ambassador at London, to inquire into the differences
then existing between England and Venezuela. On March 20, 1895,
Mr. Eayard asked Lord Kimberley of the British Foreign Office for
information regarding the situation. 4' Lord Kimberley referred him
to a statement of Sir Edward Grey, Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, in the House of Commons on March 11. In this
1. Scruggs, W. L. , The Colombian and Venezuelan Republic s, p. 295.
2. The British government was willing to submit a part of the land
in dispute to arbitration, but only that part which lay west
of an arbitrary line drawn by that government through territory
claimed by Venezuela.
3. Parliamentary Papers , v. 97, p. 6.
4. Ibid , loco citato.

17
statement the minister had declared the intention of the British
government to wait until the Venezuelan government had taken action
regarding the kidnapped British inspectors before they determined
what reparation was due England.* Mr. Eayard suggested that " it
might be advantageous to send a Special Envoy to discuss the
boundary question." 2 To this, Lord Kimberley returned an
indefinite answer.
No more correspondence passed between the governments at
Washington and London until the famous note of Mr. Clney, the
American Secretary of State. This note, dated July 2C, 1895, wat
delivered by the American ambassador tc the Marquis of Salisbury
on August 7. In this communication, Mr. Olney entered into the
history of the boundary dispute. His discussion was emphasized by
the frequent citation of earlier diplomatic correspondence. At
the conclusion of his historical resume, Mr. Olney drew the
following conclusions:-
"1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly
very large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the
one hand, and the South American Republic of Venezuela on the
ether
.
"2. The disparity in the strength of the claimants is
such that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only
through peaceful methods - through an agreement with her
1. Parliamentary Papers , v. 27, p. 7. Quoted from Hansard , p. 2,
March 11, 1695.
2. Ibid ., p. 7.
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adversary either upon the subject itself or upon an
arbitration.
"3. The controversy with varying claims on the part of
Great Britain has existed for more than half a century,
during which period many earnest and persistent efforts of
Venezuela to establish a boundary by agreement have proved
unsuccessful.
"4. The futility of the eno>«vor to obtain a conventional
line being recognized, Venezuela, for a quarter of a century,
has asked and striven for arbitration.
"5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously
refused, and still refuses to arbitrate except upon the
condition of a renunciation of a large part of the
Venezuelan claim, and of a concession to herself of a large
share of the territory in controversy.
"6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices
at the instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and
promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between
the two countries, by pressing for arbitration of the
disputed boundary, by offering to act as Arbitrator, by
expressing its grave concern whenever new alleged instances
of British aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been
brought to its notice, the government of the United States
has made it clear to Great Britain and to the world that
the controversy is one in which both its honour and its
interests are involved, and the continuance of which it
cannot regard with indifference."
^
"Parliamentary Papers, 97, p. 13.
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Mr. Clney then proceeded to a discussion of the Monroe
Doctrine. He traced ita origin and development. He dismissed
the declaration that America was no longer open to colonization
as having been long since conceded. " We are now concerned,
therefore," he writes, "only with that other practical application
of the Monroe Doctrine the disregard of which by an European
Power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness towards the
United States The rule in question has but a single
purpose and object. It is that no European Power or combination
of European Powers shall forcibly deprive an American State of
the right and power of self-government, and of shaping for itself
its own political fortunes and deetinies."
The Venezuelan case, Mr. Clney argued, clearly fell
within the limits of the Monroe Doctrine. He declared that while
that Policy did not establish a protectorate over Latin-American
States or relieve any one of them from its just obligations
under international law or prevent European powers from protect-
2ing by force their just claims, it did constitute the United
States the protector of the Western World; it did give her the
reason for resenting any invasion of the rights of the small
nations in the hemisphere. "Today," continued Mr. Clney, "the
United States is practically Sovereign on this continent, and
its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its
interposition." 3 American rights were being encroached upon
1« Parl iamentary Papers, 97, p. 15.
2. Moore,* J. E., American Diplomacy , p. 153.
3. Parliamentary Papers , 97 /p. 17 (correspondence relating to —
)
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when a foreign power undertook to occupy land on this continent
in defiance of the policy of the United States as laid down in
the presidential message of December 2, 1823.
The Monroe Doctrine, Secretary Olney contended, applied
very certainly to the present case. It is true that the dispute
between Great Britain and Venezuela has outwardly a mere boundary
controversy; and as such in itself would not furnish the occasion
for the application of the Monroe Doctrine. Secretary Olney
argued, however, that since the disputed boundary was between
States, it must of necessity imply "political control to be lost
by the one party and gained by the other?"^ That such control
was of importance could be inferred from the fact that the
territory over which the control was to be exercised was of a
2
great extent. The only satisfactory solution of the matter
could be the submission of the dispute in its entirety to
arbitration. If Great Britain would agree to submit only the
ownership of certain lands west of a line selected by herself
and not concerned in by Venezuela, she would, in reality be
disregarding the complete claim of the South America state.
Venezuela could not hope to secure any portion of the disputed
territory by force; hence if the British government should draw
an arbitrary line through this region, offer only the ownership
of the land west of it as the matter in controversy, and declare
all land west of it to be the territory of British Guiana, there
would be no recourse left to Venezuela. Such action on the part
of Great Britain, Mr. Clney asserted, would be quite as much a
1. Parliamentary Paper s, 97, p. 18.
2. As stated above (p. 15) the claim of England had grown between
1885 and 1887 by a total of 33,000 square miles.
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violation of the Monroe Doctrine as the forcible seizure of the
1
territory by the armed forces of the British Empire.
In concluding, the American Secretary states that the
purpose of his communication was to "call for a definite decision
upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline
to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to
impartial arbitration. It is the earnest hope of the President
that the conclusion will be on the side of arbitration
If he is to be disappointed in that hope, however,- a result not
to be anticipated, and in his judgment calculated to greatly
embarrass the future relations between this country and Great
Britain - it is hie wish to be made acquainted with the fact at
such early date as will enable him to lay the whole subject
gbefore Congress in his next Annual Message".
In his annual message to Congress of December 2, 1895,
President Cleveland referred to the note of Mr. Clney of
July 17, 1896, in regard to the Venezuelan boundary dispute. He
stated the purpose of that note to be the inquiry as to whether
cr not Great Britain would submit the whole boundary dispute
to arbitration. A further communication would be made to Congress
when the answer of the British government was received.
While not specifically mentioning the Monroe Doctrine,
the President declared that the note had reasserted "that the
traditional and established policy of this Government is firmly
opposed to a forcible increase by any European power of its
1. Parliamentary Papers
, 97, p. 20. (Correspondence relating to)
2. Ibid
. , p. 21.
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territorial possessions on this continent; that this policy
is as well founded in principle as it is strongly supported by
numerous precedents, that as a consequence the United States
is bound to protest against the enlargement of the area of
Eritish Guiana in derogation of the rights and against the will
of Venezuela; that, considering the disparity in strength of
Great Britain and Venezuela, the territorial dispute between them
can be reasonably settled only by friendly and impartial arbi-
tration, and that the resort to such arbitration should include
the whole controversy, and is not satisfied if one of the powers
concerned is permitted to draw an arbitrary line through the
territory in debate and to declare that it will submit to
arbitration only the portion lying on one side of it. In view
of these considerations, the dispatch in question called upon
the British Government for a definite answer to the question
whether it would or would not submit the territorial controversy
between itself and Venesuela in its entirety to impartial
arbitration"
Lord Salisbury's reply to the communication of
Secretary Clney came in the form of two notes, both dated
November 26, 18S5. In the first of these messages the British
minister took up the question of the Monroe Doctrine and its
applicability to the boundary dispute. The contention of the
American Secretary of State regarding the Monroe Policy seemed
1. President's Message and Foreign Relations , 1895. pp. 28-9.

very novel to Lord Salisbury. He argued that the principles of
President Monroe had "undergone a very notable development".
The Doctrine as interpreted by Mr. Clney was vastly different
from that first published in 1823. In that year conditions
were entirely unlike those of 1895; then the Monroe Doctrine -
directed against the Holy Alliance - was confronted by "not an
3imaginary danger". In 1895, the British minister urged, there
was no Holy Alliance to impose its "system" on America, and there
was "no danger of any European State treating any part of the
4American Continent as a fit object for European colonization.
The whole matter at issue in the present case, the
British government contended, was a simple boundary dispute
with which the principles enumerated in the message of 1823
could have no relation. The United States had never claimed
a protectorate over Latin-America, and Mr. Olney himself had
denied setting up such a claim. In spite of this, however,
Lord Salisbury saw in Mr. Clney' s note the assertion "that, if
any independent American State advances a demand for territory
of which its neighbor claims to be the owner, and that neighbor
is the colony of a European State, the United States have a right
to insist that the European State shall submit the demand and its
5
owned impugned rights to arbitration". In conclusion, Lord
Salisbury refused to recognize the Monroe Doctrine as having any
1. Parliamentary Papers , 97, p. 23. The minister writes: "As far
as I am aware, this doctrine has never been before advanced
on behalf of the United States in any written communication
addressed to the Government of another nation . . . . "
2. Ibid
. , p. 23.
3
- IMd .
, p. 23.
4. Ibid
. , p, 23.
5. Ibid .
, p. 24,

standing in international law. Furthermore, though the
Eritieh government agreed in Preeident Monroe's contention that
there should be no disturbance of the existing territorial
status in America, they could not agree with Mr. Olney's defense
p
of the doctrine. ' The British government, too, was "not prepared
to admit that the interests of the United States are necessarily
concerned in every frontier dispute which may arise between any
3.
two of the States who possess dominion in the Western Hemisphere.?
In a second dispatch of the same date, November 26, 1891?
Lord Salisbury proceeded to give an historical justification for
the claim of Great 3ritain in the boundary dispute. His note
has no relation to the Monroe Doctrine, but is simply an argument
of fact, it has, therefore, not been considered within the scope
of this paper.
In his message to Congress of December 17, 1895,
President Cleveland laid the whole matter of the boundary dispute
before that body. He did not attempt to dispute by extended
argument the position assumed by Lord Salisbury. He answered
the statements of the English minister regarding the non-legal
character of the Monroe Doctrine and his assertion that this
Policy applied to conditions now non-existent, by declaring that
1. Parl iamentary Papers, 97, p. 25: "Though the language of
President Monroe is directed to the attainment of objects which
most Englishmen would agree to be salutary, it is impossible
to admit that they have been inscribed by any adequate
authority in the code of international law *
2. Especially objectionable, of course, were Mr. Olney's words
that "distance and 3, COO miles of intervening ocean make any
permanent union between a European and an American State
unnatural and inexpedient. . . " See his note: Parliamentary
Papers
. 97, p. 25.
3. Ibid.
,
p. 25.
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it was supported by the United States as a measure of self-defense,
and as such a measure it was recognized as a legal and just
principle.
The President then took up the action of the United
States in attempting to induce the British government to submit
the question to arbitration. This effort had been unsuccessful;
Great Britain had declined the proposition of the United States
3
upon very unsatisfactory grounds.
After the review of the situation the President
announced to Congress his proposed course of action. He
recommended the appointment of an American commission to review
the question at issue and submit a report of its findings. The
determination of this commission would govern the action of the
United States. Then declared President Cleveland, it would "be
the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its
power as an aggression upon its rights and interests, the
1. Foreig-n Relations , 1895, pp. 542-3. To quote the message: "The
doctrine upon which we stand is strong and sound because its
enforcement is important to our peace and safety as a nation,
and is essential to the integrity of our free institutions and
the tranquil maintenance of our distinctive form of government.
It was intended to apply to every stage of our national life,
and cannot become obsolete while our Republic endures.
"The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those
principles of international law which are based on the theory
that every nation shall have its rights protected and its ju3t
claims enforced."
3, Foreign Relations
, 1895, p. 544. The message reads: ". . . .
this proposition has been declined by the British government,
upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be far
from satisfactory."
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appropriation by Great Britain of any. lands or the exerciae of
governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investi-
gation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela.
As a conclusion to this remarkable message President
Cleveland wrote: "I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that,
while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-
speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly
competitors in the onward maroh of civilization and strenuous and
worthy rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which
a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine
submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of
national self-respect and honor beneath which are shielded and
defended a people's safety and greatness.''
Congress, following the President's recommendation,
provided for a commission of inquiry which was authorized to report
on the boundary question. There was much excitement in both the
United States and England over the possibilities of an amed
conflict between the two great Anglo-Saxon powers. In Venezuela,
while the United States became very popular, anti- British
feeling manifested itself very strongly. Organizations were formed
there for national defense and for the boycott of English goods.*5
For a time the situation seemed very serious.
Great Britain and Venezuela, however, eventually came
to an agreement. An arbitration treaty was signed between the
1. Richardson, J. D., Messages and Papers of the President s, IX,
pT 558
.
2. Ibid .
3. Dalton, L. V., Venezuela , p. 103.
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two powers, and a joint commission of arbitration was agreed upon.
As her commissioners Venezuela appointed Chief-Justice Fuller and
Justice Brewer, both of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Great Britain selected as her representatives Lord Chief Justice
Russell and Justice Collins. For the presiding officer and umpire,
the two powers agreed upon the Rusoian jurist, Professor Martens. 1
On October 3, 1899, the commission made its report. Upon the whole
Great Britain received a proportionally much larger part of her
claim than did Venezuela. The latter country, however, was given
back the rich Yuruari territory; and the British boundary - though
stretching far to the west - was not allowed to touch Punta
Barima and the mouth of the Orinoco."' Thus the Venezuelan boundary
dispute was settled.
It seems to me that there were two main contributions
to the growth of the Monroe Doctrine in the strenuous reassertion
of its principles by President Cleveland and Secretary Olney.
Whether we assume the application of the Doctrine to the
Venezuelan boundary question to be right or wrong morally, it
3
seems to me that here it was clearly applicable.' This is one
point settled by the Venezuelan case. The position has been taken
as in the note of Lord Salisbury of November 26, 1895 to the
American government, that the question was a mere boundary dispute
and as such was not affected by the Monroe Doctrine. If, however,
1 .Edgington, T. B., The Monroe Doctrine , p. 131,
2. Ibid.
3. See, however, Criohfield, G. W., American Supremacy, II, pt.2,
chapters VII to X.
also Woolsey, T. S., America 's Foreign Policy , p. 830.
Bith of these writers disagree with the view expressed in
the text.
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the case were a matter merely of a doubtful .boundary, it seems
strange that the British government was unwilling to submit the
ownership of part of the doubtful territory to arbitration. Lord
Salisbury intimated that some of the Venezuelan claims were
unjustifiable, that they included lands inhabited by British
subjects, and that the British government would not submit these
lands to arbi trat ion.l Could we not argue that Venezuela had an
equal right to limit the arbitrable lands to only those regions
not inhabited by Venezuelans? In event the Venezuelans assumed
such a position and held to it, the only ultimate solution would
be war; and a war between powers so unevenly matched as the
impoverished South American state and the mighty British empire
could have only one conclusion. For Venezuela there was no
recourse but to arbitration, and arbitration unfettered by
conditions imposed and enforceable by superior strength. If, then,
Great Britain - by her superior physical and moral power - had
been able to deny all satisfaction to Venezuela, except such as
consisted with British interests ,and to occupy territory and
impose thereupon the English political system, could we not fairly
argue that a European system had been forcibly introduced into an
American state? Furthermore, be it remembered, in the arbitral
decision of October 3, 1899, the joint commission agreed upon a
solution of the problem which returned to Venezuela certain parts
of the territory hitherto "effectively occupied" by the British,-
especially, the mining region of Yuruari.*' In view of these
1. Parliamentary Papers , v. 97, p. 31.
2. Edgington, T. B., The Monr oe Doctrine , p. 131.
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considerations , it seems that the government of the United States
was justified in at least fearing that a European political
system might be extended on American soil. Thus, as a first result
of this boundary dispute, the Monroe Dootrine was recognized as
applying to difficulties between independent American states and
the adjacent territory of a European nation over boundaries, the
settlement of which, by other means than arbitration, might result
in the extension of the foreign control over territory rightfully
American.
In the second place, the application of the Monroe
Doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary case brought that policy
wider recognition. For the first time it was brought by name
definitely and officially before the Congress of the United Statea,
and accepted by that body. Congress, by acting upon the
President's recommendation for the appointment of an arbitral
commission, thereby ratified Mr. Cleveland's interpretation of the
Monroe Doctrine.*
Not only, however, was that Policy announced to
Congress and accepted by that body; but it was also at least
partially recognized by England. The British attitude toward the
President's announcement is of great significance. Though Lord
Salisbury at first contended that the Monroe Doctrine did not
apply to a mere boundary dispute between an American state and
the adjacent territory of a European power, he eventually yielded
to the demand of the United States that the whole matter in
1. Moore, J. B. , American Diplomacy , p. 157.
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dispute be laid before an arbitral board. In so far as he did this,
he accepted for the British government, Mr. Cleveland's
application of the Monroe Doctrine.^-
1. Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy , p. 157. Mr. Moore writes:
"It must, however, be conceded that the most important political
result of the Venezuelan incident was not the decision upon the
territorial question, but the official adoption of the Monroe
Doctrine by the Congress of the United Statee, and its explicit
acceptance by the principal maritime power of Europe."

Ill
The Monroe Doctrine under President Roosevelt.
The Spanish war of 1898 was a turning point in the
history of the United States. As such, it had a great, though -
it seems to the writer - an indirect effect upon the development
of the Monroe Doctrine. The opinion seems, however, to be wide-
spread -especially among foreigners - that the intervention of the
United States in the oolonial affairs of Spain in Cuba was an act
directly affecting the Monroe Doctrine. 1 It is not infrequently
contended that by intervening in Cuba, we broke our pledge to
Europe, a pledge that some people see in the statement that:
"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power,
we
. . . shall not interfere." 2 As a consequence of thus
violating this principle, we have abandoned so the advocates of
the theory hold - all right to ask that the inviolability of the
other principles be maintained by Europe.
1. See Antokoletz, D., La Doctrine de Monroe , p. 146: "L
'
ingerence
amer icaine dans 1
'
insurrection de Cuba etait manifestement
contr aire aux termeB du message de Monroe .
"
See also Kraus, Herbert, Die Monroedoktr in , S. 338: " Das
Verhalten der Verelnigten Staaten Spanlen gegenflber in dieser
Angelegenheit ist eine uberaus drastische und ana c haul ic he
Nichtbefolgung dea zweiten Unterpr inzips der Monroedoktr in.
"
2. In Beaumarchais , M. D. de , La Doctrine de Monroe , the author
shows a tendency to emphasize very decidedly as part of the
Monroe Doctrine our policy of non-intervention in the affairs of
existing European colonies in America. On page 144, he writes:
"S± Monroe avait declare que les Etats-Unis regarderaient
comme une disposition hostile & leur egard une intervention
auelconaue &e. 1 1 Europe dans les affaires dea Etats amer i cairn ,
il avait car contre af f irme uu'ils n
'
inter viendraient pas dans
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It seems to me, however, that the words of the message
of December 2, 1823 do not imply a pledge. 1 While, by intervening
in Cuba, we certainly did interfere with the existing colonies of
a European country in America, and in that particular we changed
our policy as announced by Monroe, that action - it seems to me -
did not at all obligate us to change our policy in any other
particular. We cannot - and do not - deny that the Spanish war was
made possible by the abandonment by the United States of the
principle of non-intervention. John Bassett Mcore says of our
Cuban policy of 1898 that it was a "most pronounced exception" to
our historic policy. We do refuse to believe that by interfering
in Cuba, the United States lost any right that she ever had to
contest the extension of the power of a European power over a free
American state.
The Spanish war affected the Monroe Doctrine indirectly.
From this short conflict the United States emerged a world power;
she had lost her isolation and had assumed a place among the great
and influential nations of the earth. 3 With her Increase in power,
the Monroe Doctrine necessarily commanded increased respect.
Furthermore, with the Western Hemisphere drawn into world politics,
it might easily happen that a policy which tended to keep America
politically isolated would sooner or later be challenged.
lee affaires des colonies europeenes pjui existaien* en 1823 .'
1. See the text of Monroe 's message in Chapter I of the text.
See also Richardson, J.D., Messages and Papers of the Presidents
II, p. 218.
2. Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy , p. 1-9.
3. Latane, J.H., America as a World Power, pp. 261,2.
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Another event in American history which affected the
development of the Monroe Doctrine at the opening of the new
century was the acquisition by the United States of the Panama
Canal Zone. This event touched the Monroe Doctrine in two quite
different ways.
The first effect which the acquisition of the Canal
Zone had upon the Monroe Doctrine arises from the methods employed
by the United States to get control of this region. It is not
to the purpose of this paper to describe the negotiations leading
up to the cession of the Canal Zone to the United States; nor is
it pertinent here to discuss the morality of the last steps in
the process whereby President Rosevelt completed that cession.
Right or wrong in itself, this policy adopted by the President
to gain his ends in Panama had on^y one effect on the republics
of Latin America; it aroused in them a fear and dread of the
United States. Columbia felt wronged by the American recognition
of Panamanan independence so shortly after that department had
revolted. Her resentment was shared by many of the Latin Repub-
lics. It began to be feared that the idea of imperialism had
seized the United States, and suspicion arouse that the Monroe
Doctrine would become the banner and shield of an expansion of
political control of the United States over both Americas. It
might seem difficult to see how the Monroe Policy could be trans-
formed tc a policy protecting the autonomy of the Latin America
republics to one of destroying their independence; but if we
consider the fear aroused in the weak republics of the South by
the action of President Roosevelt in the Panama Canal Zone matter
and if we reflect upon the countless examples of history of the
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absorption of weak nations by the strong, we could not greatly
blame the South American States for feeling somewhat uneasy at
the apparently expanding ambitions of the "Colossus of the North"
Not only the American peoples, but the nations of Europe
began to grow suspicious of the designs of the United States.
Some felt that the methods used by the Washington government to
secure the Canal Zone betrayed what had become the main purpose
of the Monroe Doctrine,- namely, to secure the imperialistic ex-
pansion of the United States amounting eventually to the political
2hegemony grf this country in the western world. Insofar as the
acquisition of the Canal Zone aided in producing or encouraging
anxiety among the Latin countries of this hemisphere respecting
the motives of the United States, to that degree the cession of
the Canal Zone injured the Monroe Doctrine and weakened its moral
force
.
The second great effect which the acquisition of the
Panama Canal Zone had upon the American foreign policy and the
Monroe Doctrine arose from the necessity of protecting that region
from possible ememies. If we assumed that the Canal must be
controlled by America, the influence of the United States must be
preponderant in all regions which have a strategic relationship
to the Canal; the Caribbean Sea and the northern coast of South
America cculd not be under the control of a power unfriendly to
the United States* These regions, therefore, have come to be of
1. American Fore ign Policy by a Diplomat, pp. 99-100.
2. Antokoletz, D., La Doctrine de MonroS , p. 72: "L'af falre du
canal de Panajaa a mis evidence que la doctrine de Monroe eat
dlrigefe non se'ul ement contre 1 1 Europe , mais aussi contre les
Etats d 1 Amerlaue autres que les Etat s Unis dans le mesure od
le3 lnteret s des* ces Etats peuvent etre en opposition avec les
vues de grandeur e t de puissance de 1 'Union federale .
"
3. American Foreign Policy by a Diplomat, p. 82.
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gpecial importance to the United States; and the Monroe Dootrine
toe applying to them has acquired a new significance. It is partly,
at lsa,st, from a realization of tbeae facta that President Rooaevel
proceeded to safeguard so strongly the Monroe Policy in the
Caribbean Sea.
Soon after his accession to the presidency, Mr. Roosevel
had an opportunity to apply the Monroe Doctrine, of which he has
been sc strenuous an advocate. This opportunity arose in the
settlement of a question in which Venezuela again - as in 1895 -
played an important part, a question of money claims, which cer-
tain European powers had upon that South American state.
The finances of Venezuela had for a long time been in a
very unsatisfactory condition. She had a very large defcrt, and
by 1901 the interest on some of this was greatly in arrears. Duri;
the dictatorship of Guzman Blanco, "El Illustre Americano" (1873-
1888), great public improvements had been made in Venezuela and
much money spent extravagently The already large debt of the
country had been much increased. With the overthrow of Blanco in
1889 a period of turbulence ensued, and the finances became worse
and worse; the debt increased and the interest on the debt fell
more and more into arrears. Finally, affairs reached a climax
in the CastDO revolution and the Matos counter-revolution in
1901 and 1902. During the first of these outbreaks much foreign
property was destroyed, and nc attempt was made by the Venezuelan
government t~ indemnify the owners or to pay the debts existing
before the revolt. To illustrate the extent of the damages
1. Dalton, L. V., Venezuela
, p. 101.
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and the indebtedness of the South American state-
,
we might
cite the claims of Germany^". In 1903 that country stated the
2
claims of her citizens in Venezuela as about 7,500,000 bol ivars
.
By the latter months of 1901 Germany, Great Britain and Italy
had agreed to intervene jointly in Venezuela to collect the debts
due their subjects.
President Roosevelt probably had some information as to
the coming course of events in the Venezuelan situation when he
wrote his first message to Congress of December 3, 19Q1. In that
message the President referred to the Monroe Doctrine very defin -
itely, and also hinted as to how he might apply it in the future.
Mr. Roosevelt's definition of the Monroe Policy as
given in the message may best be expressed in these, his own words
"The Monroe Doctrine should be the cardinal feature of
the foreign policy of all the nations of the two Americas, as it
is of the United States. Just 78 years have passed since Presiden
Monroe in his Aimual Message announced that 'the American conti-
nents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future
colonization by any European power'. In other words, the Monroe
Doctrine is a declaration that there must be no territorial
aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any
American power on American soil. It is in no wise intended as
hostile to any nation in the Old World. Still less it is intended
1. Moore, J. 3., Digest of International Law , Vol. VI, p. 692:
"The Germany government complained that during- the civil
war 8 in Venezuela from 1898 to 1900 many German subjects
in that country had been seriously damaged by the extortion
of forced loans, by the taking of cattle and other supplies
for the troops without payment, and by the ransacking and
devastation of the buildings and grounds."
2. A bolivar is a Venezuelan coin worth about twenty cents in
gold . (Eighty pfennige in the German note) For this see
Foreign Relations
,
1903, pp. 429-431.

37
to give coTC«r to any aggres3 '-on by one New World power at the
expense of any other. It is simply a step, and a long step,
toward assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the
possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere."^
The conclusion of the President's remarks on the Monroe
Doctrine is of peculiar significance. Not only does it seem
particularly well fitted to meet the approaching crisis in the
affairs of Venezuela; but it appears to indicate the step forward
in a logical chain of reasoning which lead to the so-called
"Roosevelt Corollary". Mr. Roosevelt concluded his discussion
of the Monroe Doctrine with these sentences: "This doctrine has
nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American
power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such
as it desires We do not guarantee any state against punish-
ment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not
take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American
rower .
"^
A few days after the publication of this message, on
December 11, 1901, the Imperial German Embassy in Washington
announced that their Government intended to take action against
Venezuela. The German government recounted the unpaid claims of
German citizens upon Venezuela, described the futility of the
attempt to settle the question by negotiation, and declared the
intention of Germany to be the establishment of a blockade of
Venezuelan ports,- particularly, of La Guayra and Porto Cabello.
1. Foreign Relations
, 1901, p. XXXVI, from the President's
message
.
2. Ib id
.j pp. XXXVI-XXXVII.
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The note from the Embassy stated, however, that under no circum-
stances would Germany attempt to acquire or permanently occupy
Venezuelan territory - though a temporary occupation might be
necessary
,
The State Department at Washington returned an answer
to the German note on December 16, 1901. In this reply the German
Government was thanked for its courtesy in communicating its inten-
tions to the United States. The President of this country was
described, however, in the reply as "not regarding himself as
called upon to enter into the consideration of the claims in
„ 2question"
.
For a year the German Government attempted vainly to
3
obtain satisfaction from Venezuela by peaceful means. Finally,
on December 7, 1902, Germany and Great Britain submitted two
identical ultimatums to Venezuela. In these it was demanded that
the Venezuelan Government make "immediate payment of the war claims
up to 1900 and a satisfactory statement regarding the fixing and
guaranteeing of the amount of the claims arising out of the recent
civil war." 4 On December 20, the Germany Governsment proclaimed
that from that date the Venezuelan ports of Porto Cabello and
Maracaibo were under blockade; on the same date Great Britain
^ ForTign Relations
, 1901, p. 194. The test of the German note
in regard to these particulars follows: "We declare especially
that under no circumstances do we consider in our proceedings
the acquisition or permanent occupation of Venezuelan terri-
tory .... If this measure (i.e. the blockade) does not seem
efficient, we would have to consider the temporary occupation
on our part of different Venezuelan harbor places and the
levying of duties in those places".
2. Ibid, p. 195.
3. Latane, J. H. America as a World Power . p. 273.
4. Foreign Relations
, p. 419. Quoted from a clipping of the Londor
Times .
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made a similar announcement with respect to the ports of
La Guayra, Carenero, Guanta, Cumana, and Carupano, and the
mouths of the Orinoco River, #hich were to be blockaded on and
after December 25, 190^.^" Italy announced her participation in
2the blockade by a proclamation on December 30th.
This stern action of the powers brought Venezuela to
terms: and by the e^rly months of the next year, her chief
executive, President Castro, was willing to accept the demands
of the Europeans. On February 14, 1903, the British Government
3formally raised their blockade , and two days later Germany
4followed with like action . Venezuela recognized the justice of
part of the claims of the foreign and agreed to set aside thirty
percent of her customs receipts for their payment. On their part
the governments of England and Germany agreed to submit their
claims to arbitration. On May 7, 1903 influenced by the suggestion
of President Roosevelt, the parties to the dispute agreed to sub-
5
mit their contentions to the Hague Tribunal .
During the summer months of 1903 the Hague Commissioners
representing ten countries - including the United States - held
sessions at Caracas to determine the just amount due from Vene-
zuela to each of the powers. Finally, on February 22, 1904, the
g
Hague Tribunal made its awards. A sum of 38,429,376 bolivars
T~. Foreign Relations
, 1901, p. 458
2. Ib Id* p. 604
3. Ibid., p. 475
4. Ibid, p. 437
5. Latane, J. H. America as a World Power , p. 274.
6. See footnote on p. 36 of text.

waa awarded to the ten claimant nations out of a total combined
claim of 190,676,670 bolivars . The Tribunal also decided that
in view of their greater exertions, those powers which had em-
ployed force in blockading Venezuela,- namely, England, Germany,
and Italy- should be given preferential payments^". Thus the
difficulty was concluded.
The significance of this case in the development of the
Monroe Doctrine lies, first of all, in the fact that it occasioned
a definition in part of that policy. In all the efforts of Presi
dent Roosevelt to secure the reference of the disputed claims to
the Hague Tribunal their was no mention made of the Monroe Doctrine.
One reference only, which occured in a communication of the
American ambassador to to Secretary Hay under date of February 14,
1903 is an exception; this note expressed the satisfaction of
the United States for the great regard which had been demonstrated
throughout the controversy by the British Government for the
2
Monroe Doctrine. There had been, however, no other reference
<x
to the doctrine in the correspondence . The explanation for
this is undoubtedly those words of the President of the United
States in his message of December 3, 1901. quoted above, in which
he states that the United States would not interfere in the en-
forcement by European powers of just reparation for uncollected
debts, provided such reparation did not take the form of a per-
manent occupation of American territory. 4 The Monroe Doctrine
waa thus given a limitation in part.
1. Latane, J. H. Amerioa as a World Power , pp. 275-276.
2. Foreign Relatione , 1903, pp. 475-476.
3. IbicL, For the diplomatic correspondence here referred to, con-
sult the various chapters containing respectively the American
correspondence with Germany, Great Britain and Italy.
4. gee Foreign Relations, 1901, pp. XXXVI- XXXVI I .
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Of quite as much signif icance, however, it seems to
me, as this delimitation was the care with which the powers in-
tervening in Venezuelan affairs informed the United States that
no permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory was intended1 .
While no reference was made by the foreign governments tc the
Monroe Doctrine, it would seem that in their communications to
the Washington Government, they implicitely recognized it as the
policy of the United States. As yet, however, the Monroe Doc-
trine could not be called in the strict, legal sense a principle
of international law.
During the European blockade of Venezuelan ports
President Roosevelt's view that the United States ought not to
interfere with European powers in their forceful collection of
just debts if such collection did not involve the seizure of
American territory was challenged from South America. This
challenge was the so-called "Drago Doctrine", announced in a
note dated December 29, 1902, directed to the United States from
the Argentine foreign minister, Dr. Drago. The ^earned
Argentine diplomat, looking with alarm at the European blockade
of Venezuela, based hi3 theory on the proposition of his great
1. Foreign Relations
, 1901, passim . Note the diplomatic corres-
pondence on this question. See also Foreign Relations , 1903
p. 453, for a telegram from Ambassador White to Secretary Hay,
in which he quotes Lord Lanedown as saying in behalf of the
British Government: "It is not intended to land a British
force and still less to occupy Venezuelan territory."
2. Notice specially the German note on p. 194 of December 11, 190;
quoted on p. 38 footnote 1.
3. For Dr. Drago' s note in full see Foreign Relations , 1903, p.l.
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fellow countryman, the publicist Calvo, that "according to strict
international right, the recovery of debts and the pursuit of
private claims does net justify de piano the armed intervention
of governments . ..."^
Senor Drago reasoned more specifically, and applied
his conclusions to Latin American indebtedness and European
creditors. The principle, he contended, for which Argentina
desired recognition was: "That the public debt cannot occasion
armed intervention ncr ever the active occupation of the territory
2
of American nations by a European power? This principle, Dr. Dragc
thought was implied in Monroe's message of 1823.
The Drago Doctrine met with considerable approval among
the Latin American states, especially among the smaller and less
self-reliant republics. Like the Argentine foreign minister,
some of the Latin American attempted to combine the Monroe and
the Crago Doctrine. For example, Senor Moncada, the Nicaraguan
diplomat, wrote as follows: "The collection of debts and claims
by fcrce in America is a flagrant violation of the Monroe Doctrine
,
for not only is it an attempt, but is, in reality, an act of
oppression against the independent states of America, and is
beyond all question an instance of foreign intermeddling in
American affairs." 3
1. Quoted from Hershey, A. S., "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines",
The American Journal of International Law, 1907, vol. I, part
1, p. 27.
2. Foreign Relations
, 1902, p. 4.
3. Moncada, J. M. , Imperialism and the Monroe Doctrine , p.J6
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Though the view that the Monroe and the Drago Doctrines
can be combined ia far from universal (and no less an authority
than John Bassett Moore flatly contradicts the assumption that
the two doctrines can be sc related)* the Drago Doctrine seems
to have affected the official American interpretation of the
Monroe Policy. The proposition of the Argentine diplomat, too,
was not received with great disfavor at the Hague Conference in
1907. While the Drago Doctrine as such was not officially
accepted by the Conference, a resolution was passed embodying
something of- its spirit and intention. This was the so-called
Porter Resolution. It provided that "No nation may have recourse
to force for the recovery of a debt until after arbitration has
been tried and failed."2 The influence which the Drago Doctrine
apparently exercised upon the official attitude of the United
States toward the relation of the Monroe Policy to the forcible
collection of debts in the Americas by European powers may be
seen in the policy developed by President Roosevelt in the crisis
in Santp Dominican affairs from 1904 to 1907.
The difficulties of Santo Domingo - like those of
Venezuela - were financial in their nature. This small republic
had acquired an immense debt, and had become utterly unable even
1. Moore, J. B., American Diplomacy , p. 159: "In popular dis-
cussions the position has sometimes been urged that it isa
violation of the Monroe Doctrine for a European power to em-
ploy force against an American republic for the purpose of
collecting a debt or satisfying a pecuniary demand, no matter
what may have been its origin. Fpr this supposition, which
is discredited by the declarations and acts of President
Roosevelt and Mr. Hay, there appears to be no official
sanct ion.
"
2. Merriman, P.. B., "The Monroe Doctrine - Its Fast and Present
Status", Polit ical Quarterly, March 1916, p. 39.
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to pay the interest. On September 12, 1904, the American
diplomatic representative in Santo Domingo reported that the
public indebtedness of the rerublic was $32,280,000. The esti-
mated revenues of the customs houses for the year was $1,850,000.
The proposed budget to meet only current expenses was £1,300,000.
Thus there were only $550,000 to meet the annual interest. For
that year the interest would amount to $1,7CC,0C0; this added to
the sum in arrears - about $900,000 - would make a total of
$2,6CC,00C. About two thirds of the debt was claimed by
Europeans, and most of it had been recognized by the government
of Santc Domingo.
In the fall of 1904 certain European powers became
dissatisfied with this situation. The Dominican Republic was
practically bankrupt, and the situation had become intolerable.
The Europeans requested the United States to take charge of and
administer the Dominican customs and to oversee the distribution
of the revenue. If this government refused to to arrange the
affairs of the recalcitrant republic , the foreign governments
would be compelled "in the interests of their citizens to re-
sort to measures of coercion".^
The attitude of the United States was outlined by
President Fcosevelt ir. his message to Congress of December 6,
1904. He declared there that:-
"Any country whose pecple conduct themselves well can
count upon our hearty friendship. If a naticn shows that it
knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social
1^ Foreign Relations , 19C5, p. 302. See also Latane, J. K.,
Amer ica as a World Power, p. 279.
2 » Foreign Relations , 1905.- See Hay ! 3 note on, p. 298. See also
Latane, J. H. , for the quotation cited above.
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and political matters, if it keeps order and paye its obligations
it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic
wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening
of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere,
ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in
the Western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly,
in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exer-
cise of an international police power?"
On December 30, 1904, Mr. Kay suggested to the govern-
ment cf Santo Domingo that it request the United States to tak*
2
charge of its customs. Negotiations were thus started for the
purpose of obtaining control by Washington over the Dominican
finances. The Commissioners of Santo Domingo conducted these
negotiations with great caution and showed much anxiety concerning
the possible motives of the United States-. They were greatly
alarmed Jest armed intervention would mean ultimate anexation.^
After the exercise cf some patience, however, the Washington
government succeeded, on February 7. 1905, in concluding an
agreement with Santc Domingo whereby the United States should
guarantee the terrirorial integrity of the Dominican Republic,
1. Foreign Relations . 1904, p. XLI,
2. Latane, J. K. , America as a World Power , p. 280.
3. See the diplomatic correspondence in Foreign Relations, 1905,
pp. 298-325. The belief that the intervention of the United
States meant ultimate annexation was shared by some foreigners
for instance, see De Barral - Montferrat, De Monroe a Rcoseveli,
pp. 285-286: -'Protection heir, protectorat au.icurd' hui , apsorp
tlon d&aain, telles sont par rarpcrt au reste des continents
Americains , lee diver see etapes a traver s lesquelles M.
Roosevelt entraine sa patrl e sans crainte comme sans scruples .
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take charge of its custom houses, administer its finances, and
settle its obligations, foreign as well as domestic^ Fifty-
five percent of the republic's revenues were reserved for foreign
creditors
.
Though the United States Senate failed to ratify this
protocol the President insisted upon it with great determination
and under a modus vivendl succeeded in executing it. By this
arrangement the Dominican receiver of customs, though officially
appointed by the chief executive of the Dominican Republic, was
actually nominated by President Roosevelt. Finally, on
February 25, 1907, the Senate agreed to a treaty with the Domini-
can Republic which carried the terms of the protocol of February
4, 1905 into the stronger position of toeing recognized by the
representatives of the people. By this treaty it was agreed that
the general receiver of customs in Santo Domingo and his assis-
tants should be appointed by the President cf the United States
and protected by this government; It was also provided that until
paying her bonded debt in full, Santo Domingo was not to incur
further indebtedness without the consent of the United States. 3
Thus the Santo Dominican question was temporarily
settled at least. Under the modus vivendl , by the time the
treaty of 1907 was signed, conditions in the Republic were very
much improved. The customs receipts had been almost doubled and
the debt was reduced by nearly one half^
1. Stephens, F. F., "The Mcnroe Doctrine", University cf
Missouri rulletin. Vol. 17, p. 22.
2. Foreign Relation s. 19.05. pp. 342-3.
3. Ibid ,. 1907 . See Chapter on Dominican Republic.
4. Latane, J. K. , America as a World Power, pp. 279-261.
The debt had been reduced from ?32, 280,000 to $17,000,000.
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President Roosevelt in his interpretations of the
Monroe Policy made a ne* contribution to it, a contribution
which many people now term the "Roosevelt Corollary". The
development cf this corollary was perfectly logical; a brief
examination of the cases in which Mr. Roosevelt applied the
Mcnrce Doctrine would give good evidence of that. How the
corollary developed, then, can be determined by a study of the
recent history of the Monroe Doctrine; the conditions that de-
termine its application car. best be determined from the Presiden-
tial message to the Senate of December 7, 1905:
"An aggrieved nation," wrote Mr. Roosevelt, "can with-
out interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, take what action it
sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American States,
providing that action does not take the shape of interference
with their form of government or the dispoilment of their terri-
tory under any disguise. But, short of tikis, when the question
is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to
collect it is a blockade, or a bombardment, or the seizure of the
custom houses, and this means as has been said above, what is in
effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, of
territory. The United States thus becomes a party in interest,
cecause under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European
power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these
republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or un-
disguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power
in question can collect any debts, unless there ie interference
on the part of the United States." 1
T~, Foreign" Relations
,
1905, pp. 334-335.
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These words of President Rossevelt placed frankly
before the Senate two possible alternatives. We could not,
he declared, protect under the Monroe Doctrine any nation which
misconducts itself from the just consequences of that misconduct.
If one of the Latin Republics defalte in the payments of its
debts, we could not justly intervene to prevent the collection
of those debts unless that collection involved the seizure and
occupation of American territory. If, however, the debts could
be collected in no other way than by taking possession of the
custom houses and administering the finances of the country, the
United States would be placed in this very difficult dilemma:
to refuse to allow the European creditors to collect their iust
debts would be manifestly unjust and unfair; on the other hand,
to allow a European power to occupy American territory, now free
and independent, and to administer the financial affairs of a
soverign state would certainly impair the soverignty of that
state and that wou^d be a plain violation of the historic Monroe
Doctrine
.
In this dilemma Mr. Roosevelt found what appears to
be the only solution: the Roosevelt Corollary. This theory the
President had developed apparently during his studies of the
Santc Dominican problem. He had hinted at it in several speeches
lectures, and messages delivered during the years of 1905 and 19C7
,
In August, 1915, in a lecture at Lake Chautauqua on the foreign
policy of the United States as regards Latin America, the Presides ;
gave expression to this Roosevelt Corollary.
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He said: "Personally, I should always prefer to see
this country step in and put through such an arrangement ( i .t .
a financial agreement guaranteeing control of the customs houses
to the creditor nation) rather than let any foreign country
undertake it. I do not want to see any foreign power take
possession of, permanently or temporarily, the customs houses of
an American republic in order to enforce- its obligations, and
the alternative may at any time be that we shall be forced to do
so ourselves?^-
These words contained the essence of the Roosevelt
Corollary. It implies, of course, that the United States be
ready to exercise the "international police power" mentioned
by President Roosevelt in his message to Congrees of December
6, 1904. It means that the United States shall guarantee the
European powers the good behavior of the smaller Latin American
states, that the United States shall be the policeman of this
continent. As one aut -or puts it, under such a system the
American navy will "be converted into a debt collecting agency
for the powers of Europe". ^ The same author mentions one escape
from this condition, - namely, the imposition upon the smaller
republics cf this hemisphere of a provision like the Piatt
amendment, by which the United States reserves to itself the
right of interventlcn in Cuba under certain circumstances. As
an alternative means of escape, he suggests that financial contro
versies cf the type of the Dominican affair be eubnitted to the
3Eague Court.
T! Stephens, F. FT7"The Monroe Doctrine", University of Missouri
Bulletin , Vol. 17, pp. 21-22.
2. Latane, J. H., Amgrica as a World Power, p. *8c
3. Ibid.
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As matters stand today, however, we have accented
the Roosevelt Corollary as a sound interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine. "This", writes Professor Kart, "is clearly the way
out of a serious quandary. The United States must either 'fish
cr cut bait'. Tc hold off the avenger because he was hurting
the American Doctrine and thereby endangering the United States
would have been futile, unless the United States somehow com-
pelled the offending state to become a real state?^" That the
United States has accepted the Roosevelt Corollary is indicated
by the subsequent intervention of this country in the affairs of
Haiti and of Nicaragua during the administrations of Presidents
Taft and Wilson. We have, writes Professor Stephens, a virtual
2protectorate over these countries at the present tine.
1. Kart, A. E • , The L!onrce Doctrine : An Interpretation, p. 318.
2. Stephens, F. F. , "The Monroe Doctrine", UnJj£e^ity_of Missouri
Bulletin , Vol. 17, p. 24.

IV
The Monroe Doctrine since the Administration
of Roosevelt.
During the closing months of the administration of
President Taft one of the most remarkable among recent
applications of the Monroe Policy occurred. This was the
Magdalena Bay case of 1912. In this case, the nation against
which this government raised the standard of the Monroe Doctrine
was no European power, nor had that nation any evident designs
upon the territory of this continent or upon the sovereignty of
any American State. The power in question was Asiatic Japan;
and the object of all the difficulty was the ownership, not by
Japan, but by a Japanese fishing company of a harbor in Mexican
territory, Magdalena Bay in Lower California.
Magdalena Bay is a large inlet on the west coast of
Lower California, about three thousand miles from Panama. Off
the coast there is a moss which contains a valuable dye. It is
said that lumber might be produced in that region and that
cattle raising^ is also a possibility.
^
The Mexican government had granted several million
acres of land in the vicinity of the bay to an American lumbering
company. This organization, however, proved to be a failure;
and their chief creditor, a lumberman of New Hampshire, took
1. "The Magdalena Bay Resolution", The American Journal of
International Law , Vol. VI, pp. 937-9.
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over the rights cf the commissioners. He tried to recoup
himself by selling the land to a company of Japanese.
This acticn on the part of the New Hampshireman was
looked upon with official disfavor in the United States.
Secretary of State Knox considered the acquisition of Magdalena
Eay by a Japanese corporation as a menace to the welfare of the
United States, even if the Japanese stockholders in that organ-
ization were in a minority. This attitude was assumed regardless
of the Mexican law that no concession of land in Mexico remains
valid if the concessionaires attempt to transfer their rights
to a foreign government.
After some investigation, the Senate on August 2, 1912,
passed a resolution introduced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of
Massachusetts, which read as follows:
"Resolved, that when any harbor or other place in the
American continent i3 so situated that the occupation thereof
for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications
of the safety of the United States, the Government of the United
States could not see without grave concern the possession of
such harbor or other place by any corporation or association
which had such a relation to another Government not American as
to give that Government practical power of control for national
purposes?
Senator Lodge asserted that this r2solution was not an
attempt to extend the Monroe Policy. If we held strictly to the
1. "The Magdalena Bay Resolution", The American Jour_nal_of
International Law, Vol. VI, pp. 937-8.
2. Ib i
d
.
, loco citato .
3. Ibid., loco ci tato.
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letter of the Message of 1823, of course, we could not apply this
policy to the action of any power outside of Europe. In 1903
Admiral Mahan had stated the opinion that the operations of the
powers of the Far East and the Pacific could not be included
under the prohibitions of the Monroe Policy. It seems now,
however, that, as Professor Merriman writes, "that view can
3
scarecely be regarded as tenable today". Such a development of
the Monroe Doctrine, which estende its applicability to Asiatic
powers, seems entirely within the spirit of the original message
of Monroe. In the day of that President, Japan as a world power
was not dreamed of. Today any statement of world policy concern-
ing world politics in general must consider Japan; and the
extension of the Monroe Doctrine to include Japan as well as the
European powers is simply to recognize the fact that Japan has
become one of the Great Powers.
That this Lodge resolution extends the Monroe Doctrine
is not much doubted among the Latin-American States. It can
scarcely be said that the recognition of that fact awakens
altogether pleasant feelings in the minds of our southern fellow-
Americans. If the United States were to show "grave concern"
when under certain circumstances an American power granted land to
a foreign business corporation, it might be fair to question
1. See the text of the Monroe Doctrine quoted on pp. 1-4 of the
text
.
2. Merriman R. B. , "The Monroe Doctrine - its Past and Present
Status", Political Quarterly . No. 7, March, 1816, pp. 27-8.
3. Ibid
. ,
p. 28.
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whether or not the United Statea were abridging the sovereign
righta of that power. The Lodge resolution, therefore, was not
wholly welcome to the Latin republics as a further development
of the Monroe Doctrine.
Regarding this point, however, it must be said that the
"grave concern" of the United States might under the circumstances
specified be aroused with entire justice. No nation - howevsi
benevolent and unaggressive - could afford to allow itself to be
endangered. Whether or not the occupation of Magdalena Bay or
of any other harbor in this hemisphere by a foreign corporation
would really endanger the safety of the United States is a
matter for diplomats and military authorities to decide.
Assuming that the United States would be so endangered, it seems
to the writer that the Lodge resolution was entirely justifiable.
If such be the case, it should certainly be considered a
legitimate extension of the Monroe Doctrine.
During the administration of President Wilson the
situation in Mexico has been big with possibilities for the
United States. Several times intervention by the United States
in the disorderly affairs of that country has seemed inevitable;
twice we have actually sent armed forces into Mexico,- once in
May, 1914 at Vera Cruz, and again as a sequel to the Villista
raid on Columbus, New Mexico of February, 1916. Though in
either of these two instances of military action was the Monroe
Doctrine involved so far as we can know, and that policy has not
yet been actually concerned in the difficulty at all (unless the
State Department has concealed that fact from general knowledge),
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the situation haa been such that there were serious possibilities
that the United States might have again to reassert these ancient
principles of Monroe. It is with these possibilities that this
paper is now concerned.
The Madero regime was overthrown in Mexico in February,
1913. 1 President Madero and Vice-president Suarez, while
prisoners cf the provisional government of General Huerta, were
murdered. The circumstances of their death were such as to
arouse the grave suspicion of the United States government that
the Huerta administration was responsible for the assassination.
This suspicion was sufficient to cause President Wilson to refuse
recognition to Huerta as the head of the Mexican Republic. In
the Meantime, under Venustiano Carranza, Governor of the State
of Coahuila, a counter-revolution against Huerta in the name of
Constitutionalism arose. ^ The Constitutionalist armies under
the leadership of Francisco Villa, with the moral support of the
government at Washington, won some notable victories; but Huerta -
now virtually a dictator - remained for many months in power
at Mexico City.
During all this fighting a vast amount of property
belonging both to Americans and Europeans was destroyed. The
government of the United States steadily refused to take
sufficient action in Mexico to protect adequately either American
property or American lives; and European nationals were, of course,
1. Enriquez, R. de Z., The Case of Mexico , pp. 60-134.
2. Reed, J., Insurgent Mexico , pp. 264-6.
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left by the Americana to shift for themselves. The lives of all
foreigners were in danger. Finally, in February, 1914, the
murder of William S. Benton, a British subject, brought matters to
a crisis.
The Benton case illustrates one of the possibilities
which might have forced the United States to intervene in Mexico
in defense of the Monroe Doctrine. By her time-honored policy
the United States had refused to sanction intervention by
European powers in defense of their nationals. At the same time,
through the policy of "watchful waiting" shw was refusing to
intervene and protect them herself. It is not unlikely that the
European powers might soon have offered the government at
Washington the alternative of intervening by itself in Mexico
to protect the lives and property of foreigners and thus preserv-
ing the Monroe Doctrine, or of witnessing a joint European
intervention and the destruction of our Latin-American policy.
The outbreak of the Great War in July and August, 1914, however,
effectively turned the attention of Europe from Mexico.
The comment of the English press on the Benton case is
interesting because it shows clearly -vthat the Monroe Doctrine
and its extension, the Roosevelt Corollary, had become firmly
fixed in the British mind. The London Sunday Times asserted, for
example, that "the nation which demands respect for the Monroe
Doctrine has a peculiar obligation to the other Powers"?" Of
still more signigicance was the statement of the London Morning
Post : "The moment has now come, we imagine, where President
1. Literary Digest , March 7, 1914. Vol. 48, p. 481.
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Wilson will either announce hie plan for obtaining security for
lives and property of foreigners in Mexico or declare that the
Monroe Doctrine and the policy of the United States are not
opposed to action by other countries to secure the welfare of
their own subjects in Mexico".^" Articles of this kind seem to
indicate that the United States might have been obliged in
defense of the Monroe Doctrine to exercise eventually the
"international police power" claimed under the Roosevelt Corollary,
and to intervene in Mexico to forestall European intervention.
Thus it can easily be seen that while at no time during the
Mexican revolutions of the last few years have we invoked the
Monroe Doctrine, the possibility of being compelled to resort
to it was never absent.
1. Literary Digest , March 7, 1914. Vol 48, p. 481.

Conclusion.
The foregoing pages have shown - it is the sincere hope
of the writer - that the Monroe Doctrine is a living and growing
thing. It is not a dead issue, "an obsolete shibboleth"* a formula
of words eloquent enough in the day* f James Monroe and John
Quincy Adams, but of no significance today. It is not rigid and
fast, applicable to one and only one set of conditions - conditions
which for ninety years have been non-existent. It is not mere
words taken in their strict and literal sense. It is a growing
and expanding Policy; a Policy which has always guided the Ameri--
can diplomacy of the United States, and which therefore has
constantly varied in its expression to meet the varying problems
to which it has been applied.
It is my hope, too, that these pages have tended to
show that the Monroe Doctrine is not a mere selfish policy, that
it is not a shrewd plan of the Yankee to hold off European
expansion in Latin-America until he himself can find the time to
extend his control over the free countries to the South. It is
not the slogan of an advancing imperialism. Surely our policy in
Cuba under Roosevelt and in Mexico under Wilson has demonstrated
that we as a nation do not desire to gain more territory against
1. Bingham, H. , The Monroe Doctrine: An Obsolete Shibboleth ,
2. Hart, A. B., The Monro e Doctrine: An InterprVtaflon, see the
preface, p. v.
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the will of the inhabitants of that territory. Surely our
action in theae two cases, of which there are too few examples
in history, would indicate that the United States does not
wish the Monroe Doctrine to be a subtle cloak for her expansion
over this Western Hemisphere,
The Monroe Doctrine - we rather believe - serves a high
and unselfish purpose. This I write not forgetful of the fact
that our policy - like the policies of all the world powers -
is, and at present must be, largely dictated by our own interests.
The Monroe Doctrine, while it has insured the peace and safety
of the United States, has also been a beneficient shield to the
weaker countries of the New World. It has allowed them to
develop free from much of the strife and turmoil that has followed
European expansion in the four corners of the world. Above all,
it has saved these smaller nations their liberty; it has prevented
their dismemberment. It has been argued, on the otherhand, that
an enlightened nation like England or France could and would
govern states like Ecuador, Venezuela, Columbia, and the Central
American countries better and in a more enlightened manner than
these States govern themselves. This is possibly quite true;
but it is questionable whether to proud Latin-Americans the loss
of their liberty, together with the possibilities of being
involved in a catastrophe like the present war in which the
colonies of the Great Powers the world over - as well as the
mother countries - are included, would not more than compensate
for the benefits of a foreign rule. After all, liberty is the
proudest possession of a people; and this - at least - the Monroe
Doctrine has, to a high degree, guaranteed to the Latin republics.
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As to the future of the Monroe Doctrine, what is there to
say? There are those who urge that it be abandoned, and they are
ready with their reasons - good and bad. There are those who urge
that we combine with this Policy the concept of Pan-Amer icanism,
and allow the great nations of the Southern Continent - Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile - to be co-guarantors with us of the Monroe
Doctrine. This idea - surely well-calculated to remove any
suspicions on the part of the South Americans regarding our
intentions - is beautiful enough in theory, but will it work out
in practise? It would seem that for that the time is not yet
quite ripe. There is yet another school of thinkers which
desires us to ally ourselves with some great European power,
preferably Great Britain, to aid in maintaining the Monroe Policy.
This plan has the great objection that we might under such an
arrangement be drawn into another great European struggle over
natters with which we had very little concern. The best solution
seems to me to be a continuance in our policy of non-participation
in "entangling alliances" and the strengthening of this country
herself so that she may be ready to meet the obligations that the
Monroe Doctrine in its newer aspect has put upon her. As the
Southern Countries develop and grow stronger, we should allow
them to bear more and more their share of the burden of the
Monroe Doctrine, but we should never by this arrangement so bind
ourselves that the Great Republic could not act alone whenever her
honor and the safety and welfare of her sister republics in this
New World demanded it. The Monroe Doctrine is, after all, first
and foremost, the policy of the United States.
_•
_ The End -S-
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